Great Power Competition

The administration’s future approach to the region seems destined to echo its tendencies since January, including an emphasis on negotiated deals (as with Gaza and Iran), limited use of military force (as with the Houthis), and massive economic agreements in the name of countering China’s influence.

Beijing specializes in exactly the type of infrastructure reconstruction assistance that Syria so urgently needs and may look to exploit any further delays or prohibitions stemming from U.S. export controls.

Demand for Russian weapons has hardly disappeared—MENA officials would see even a limited or temporary Ukraine deal as a green light to quickly take advantage of Moscow’s new supply chains, so Washington should prepare accordingly.

The administration’s push to end the Ukraine war could bear fruit, but only if pressure is applied to both sides.

Far from signaling a strong trilateral alliance, their history of often transactional cooperation reveals strategic gaps that Washington can leverage to help curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Riyadh has demonstrated the desire and ability to play a bigger diplomatic role in the Middle East and beyond, so Washington should support these aspirations—while taking care to balance relations with other Gulf states and ensure that Riyadh contributes constructively.

As the new government looks for quick answers to its emergency energy needs, it may turn to sanctioned Russian ship operators and other illicit actors.

Mismatching objectives and means has repeatedly produced failure and undermined consensus, but Washington no longer has the luxury of bad statecraft on pressing issues like Iran’s nuclear program.

A senior NATO official joins U.S. and regional experts to discuss how the Trump administration’s initial peacemaking forays might affect the war’s broader geopolitical stakes, from great power competition in the Middle East to rare-earth minerals and Western counter-messaging.